It's the New Year...Something has to go.

Smoking is not an exterior concern wherein physical factors alone would be at stake. The fatigued mind relieves itself in a self-affirmation as nonintellectual as possible. In this, smoking is nonetheless an expressly human attitude, and I do not think there is any comparable animal attitude. When smoking, the human mind not only surrenders itself to a squandering that is indefensible according to sound reason: it is above all a squandering deprived of meaning, deprived of any knowledge of itself; such deprivations allow absence to appear. We sacrificed to appease the gods or to reconcile ourselves with them, we buy jewels to affirm a social level or for seduction, we take walks in the mountains to make up for the excesses of the cities, we read poems for a thousand reasons: and even excluding exterior reasons, we can talk about these various kinds of waste; they enter from many sides, wrongly or rightly, within the intellectual connections that constitute us. Smoking, on the contrary, is the most exterior thing to our understanding. Insofar as we are absorbed in smoking we escape ourselves, we slip into a semiabsence, and if it is true that a concern for elegance is always connected to waste, smoking is elegance, is silence itself.

Collier Schorr, Smoke Ring, 1999, c-print mounted on aluminum, 20x16 inches

It is possible that today men spend no less on smoking tobacco than our forefathers did on sacrificial animals. It is possible that expenditure won through the elegance and lightness of smoke: animal sacrifices must have been smething heavy. Closer to us, luxury or military glory also lack lightness. But is it certain that tobacco completely staisfies the demand to which it seems to respond?

Gilles Deleuze smoking it up

If it is a question of attaining glory, and beyond its heavy forms its transparency (which risks having a resemblance of its opposite), it seems to me that an elegant solution like tobacco has but one role: it designates a reef. And without doubt, it is the same with most elgance. Through elegance, we get away from heaviness, but lightness is paid for with insignificance. We avoid the excesses of the tragic. Above all, we avoid becoming comical. Meanwhile, before the inanity into which elgance slips, it would be surprising if one time someone cried out: "It is better to be heavy! It is better to be comical!" Elegance settles beside this reef, underlines it, and presents it as a pretext for not going further. Is this tolerable?

- Georges Bataille, excerpts from "Socratic College", The Unfinished System of Non-Knowledge, Minnesota, 2001



..................................................................now i have never
gotten into this image of being a professional.......except once.....................
....when i wanted to be a professional smoker......you may laugh.....................
at me.......but youre all successful smokers......and youre all......................
professional........everybody who smokes is a professional at it.....................
....you just dont remember how hard it was to achieve mastery........................
....but when i was a kid of fifteen or sixteen i went to this high...................
school......an engineering school near the brooklyn academy of.......................
music and i used to take the train to pacific street or atlantic.....................
avenue.....and while i was hurrying along to get to school on time...................
...which was on fulton street.....id be hurrying along and id see....................
...these guys high school kids too but older wiser.......lounging....................
...idly coolly in the portico of the williamsburgh savings bank......................
.....leaning negligently against the posters of the brooklyn academy.................
...of music.....gracefully smoking........and though you could get...................
......detention slips for coming late to school these guys didnt look................
...worried about a thing like that........and if you were an insider.................
.....on the football team or in the school government..........you...................
...never got detention slips anyway......and i felt that i could be..................
..one like that......a smoker

Damien Hirst, Horror at Home, 1995

...............................so i bought a pack of cigarettes and..................
i tried.....now i had a very good idea of the type of smoker i was...................
going to be........a continental type.......so i went to a downtown..................
tobacco shop and bought a pack of gauloises and practiced at night...................
....and if you dont remember it takes a lot of practice just to open.................
..up the pack in a professional way......because you have to break...................
.the cellophane and get past the tin foil in two smooth moves........................
...with everybody watching and still make sure they can tell its.....................
..gauloises youre smoking.....and the cigarettes are all packed......................
...tight together so you have to jar one loose by knocking the pack..................
...against the back of your other hand or fish it out with two.......................
.....fingernails.....then get it smoothly to your mout all the time .................
..youre concentrating on looking like jean gabin on a marseilles.....................
street corner........................................................................
..............so i used to open up the pack at home just to avoid....................
these problems.......and practice with an open pack in front of a....................
mirror.....flicking the cigarette up in the pack and either moving...................
...it directly to my mouth or bringing it out between thum and.......................
.....forefinger.......and then going back to holding it between the..................
...two middle fingers........the way gabin would have................................

Sarah Lucas, Nature Abhors a Vacuum, 1998, cigarettes

......................................................and standing...................
....there in the winter on the windy street it was a trick just to get...............
..your cigarette lighted......that counted most if you could do it...................
on the fist try by cupping one hand against the wind and striking....................
..the match with the other.......and once it was in your mouth.......................
you had to keep it hanging there from your lower lip all the time....................
you were talking......which you managed by slightly wetting the......................
paper so it stuck....and this was particularly effective when........................
you were talking french.....but mostly we were talking english.......................
.....which seemed to make this harder................................................
.......................................so there was another style....................
.....of professional smoking.......an american a western style.......................
......cowboy or luberjack........which seemed to suppose you were....................
....smoking in a windstorm and which didnt require you to keep.......................
...smoking while talking because in this style you didnt do very.....................
..much talking.....mostly you kept your mouth shut..........and in...................
.this style you fished out your cigarette once again between rounded.................
...forefinger and thumb........somehow rotated it downward over......................
.....your fingers so that it wound up between your middle fingers....................
.....
but with the lit part inwards toward your palm where you kept...................
....it sheltered from the wind.......and there was a style of lighting...............
...up that went along with this method.........you held the pack of..................
..matches in your left hand and the match you were striking head.....................
.inward between the middle two fingers of your right hand............................
which you moved along the striking surface while pressing down.......................
...the matchhead with your thumb.....so that if you were good at it..................
....you had your light sheltered in the cup of both your hand and....................
...if you were clumsy you would burn your palm.......................................

Richard Prince, Cowboy, color photograph, 1991-92 (appropriated image from a Marlboro advertisement)

................................................and i know all this..................
...
because i was a failure at it.....at professional.................................
representational smoking........and i gave it up......but not right..................
...away and not completely........because at first i turned to a more................
..abstract form.......pipe smoking...................................................



David Antin, from "the value of the real thing", in Tuning, NDP, 1984 (alas, it's near impossible to have the spacings appear on a blog exactly as they do in print...nonetheless, I tried)


Man Ray photograph of Marcel Duchamp

Maybe one or two when I'm at the bars. But that's it, I swear.

What is a set?

Or rather, as Nate asked in relation to Alain Badiou's writings: what in the hell is a set? I had to look again myself, since not being a mathematician prevents me from having a firm grasp on the implications of the question. From Cantor's 1899 letter to Dedekind found in From Frege to Godel: A Sourcebook of Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931:

“If we start from the notion of a definite multiplicity (a system, a totality) of things, it is necessary, as I discovered, to distinguish two kinds of multiplicities (by this I always mean definite multiplicities).

For a multiplicity can be such that the assumption that all of its elements “are together” leads to a contradiction, so that it is impossible to conceive of the multiplicity as a unity, as “one finished thing”. Such multiplicities I call absolutely infinite or inconsistent multiplicities.

As we can readily see, the “totality of everything thinkable”, for example, is such a multiplicity; […]

If on the other hand the totality of the elements of a multiplicity can be thought of without contradiction as “being together”, so that they can be gathered together into “one thing”, I call it a consistent multiplicity or a “set”.”



I was reminded of a series of events which led to an uncanny experience at the University of Washington Bookstore several years back. Their philosophy section which occupied a corner of the store was having a growth spurt. At one point it was broken apart into one wall, which was "philosophy", and another, which was "critical theory". Eventually they both migrated to a different part of the bookstore altogether. I had wandered in one day going straight to the area of the bookstore where philosophy used to be, only to find that it had become computer science and programming(!). The perceptual shock was very strange indeed. The change itself was, perhaps, somewhat prophetic.

Currency, Capital, Conundrum...

In contrast with the traditional actions of the museum in masking its power structure, when in the 1970s it was sustained only as the fantasmatic spectral entity, the museum today does exactly the opposite: it destroys not itself, but its fantasmatic image/support. As opposed to the 1970s, when the museum was segregated and survived as spectral entity, it seems that in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s the museum survives in reality by sacrificing, destroying its fantasmatic support. The museum openly assumes the role of what it is possible to call the devil of transparency, but the paradox of self-exposure, self-transparency tells us that this transparency makes it even more enigmatic. The art community thinks - not wanting to accept this - that behind the cold manipulative surface, there must be something else.

From a very interesting piece over at $ that also touches on the significance of Duchamp's readymades - something I had likewise made the part-subject of my inaugural post.

Tarde

For anyone interested in Gabriel Tarde studies, Goldsmiths University has several papers (minus Alberto Toscano's, unfortunately) in pdf format available from a conference earlier this month entitled Gabriel Tarde: Economy, Psychology, and Invention. There is also a pdf there of Tarde's Social Laws: An Outline of Sociology - although it has security features, and cannot be printed.

Got Culture?

Alain Badiou has a long-standing malaise with anything that smacks of "culture". Rather than seeing this as a flat out rejection of culture's importance, his reservations seem to derive more from a strategic insistence on truth(s) that are removed (subtracted) from the 'post-modern' field of cultural relations - and hence, removed from language games, "idealinguistry", and the 'worshiping' and production of difference. "Difference", as that which is 'ethically' projected and maintained in culture, is difference in a pejorative form for Badiou, since, to foreground it - as culture so often does - is essentially to pervert it. This is also crucial to understanding why he has misgivings about the 'state' of contemporary art - though interestingly enough, as a critique of Romanticism, his "inaesthetics" is also suspiciously Romantic; and when criticizing "Formalist-Romantic" artists, his selection of "Affirmationists" of the past are nonetheless "Formalist-Romantic" themselves. Badiou is quick in his "Manifesto of Affirmaitonism", which appeared in 2005, to forward that " "cultures" are nothing but restored products, recycled old things." (Lacanian Ink 24/25).

There are, to be sure, certain points at which I am sympathetic with Badiou's understanding of art, but only at certain points. Much art, as he no doubt recognizes, is prone to being treated as 'cultural currency' (to borrow a phrase from the notoriously bad 'good art movie' High Art), and in such cases novelty often becomes synonymous with various 'marginal cultural identities' that are then able to enter the system of commodity exchange on the basis of this institutionally accepted 'otherness' that has been moved through the back door. Badiou's onto-mathematics continues to insist that difference is simply what there is in the pure presentation of any multiple, and that these cultural nodes of identification of difference are what truths will always "render insignificant".

"But what we must recognize is that these differences hold no interest for thought, that they amount to nothing more than the infinite and self-evident multiplicity of humankind, as obvious in the difference between me and my cousin from Lyon as it is between the Shi'ite 'community' of Iraq and the fat cowboys of Texas." (Ethics, p. 26)



But, if the problem is one of the 'ethical' measure of these differences as a humanistic concern, aren't they also paradoxically part of what a 'desire for monstrosity' should search for - that is, the 'aesthetico-political' subjects in their collective being? Perhaps this is why his long-standing malaise also carries with it a just as long-standing interest. As far back as 1981 he was considering culture in an altogether different manner, and his 1998 interview with Peter Hallward, which appears in the appendix to his Ethics, would also confirm his "interest" in culture - an understanding of culture as a 'network of relations' that no doubt stretches back to the Cultural Revolution and his Maoist (now "Post-Maoist") days, as Bruno Bosteels recently pointed out. Bosteels even indicates a possible kinship with Badiou's philosophical activities/investments and the ideas put forth by Leferbve in his Critique of Everyday Life - a 'kinship' which for my part, I would also be willing to perceive in De Certeau's The Practice of Everyday Life, or even other, somewhat less likely, comparisons. Taking philosophy outside of the University and investigating its relationship to everyday practices is, after all, part of what Badiou recognizes as one of the principle tasks of modern philosophy, and French philosophy in particular.



"Badiou himself, finally, in recent years has come to admit that a full understanding of the sequence of events from the late sixties and early seventies of course cannot leave the conditions of politics, art, science, and love utterly and completely disjoined according to a typically modernist bias of their self-declared autonomy. Thus after seeing how the four conditions of truth are to be separated as clear and distinct ideas, most notably in Manifesto for Philosophy, he invites us to reconsider how historically they are most often intertwined, forming mixed combinations such as "proletarian art" or "courtly love."

[...]Badiou even went so far as to accept the notion that "culture", rather than merely being a version of "art" emptied of all truth, as he claims in the introduction to his Saint Paul, might actually be an appropriate name for the "networking (reseau) or "knotting" (nouage) among the various truth conditions that could be newly theorized as "culture", if "we can consider culture to be the network of various forcings, that is, at a given moment in time, the manner in which the encyclopedic knowledge of the situation is modified under the constraints of various operations of forcing which depend on procedures that are different from one another"

- Bruno Bosteels, "Post Maoism: Badiou and Politics"






"There are always several procedures working through entangled or interconnected situations. It's what I hope to explain, once I've deciphered and symbolized the problem, probably according to my own concept of culture. In the end, a culture, to the extent that it can be though or identified by philosophy, is a singular interconnected configuration of truth-procedures.

I think there are truth-procedures everywhere, and that they are always universal; that a Chinese novel, Arabic algebra, Iranian music...that all this is, in the end, universal by right. Simply, the conditions of their concrete universalization have followed a complicated history. On the other hand, I would admit that there is an element of the cultural site, which I would see in a system of interconnection, in which there is always something contingent, and also an aspect of sedimentation, of conservation, which is irreducibly particular. Here I'm speaking prospectively, slightly feeling my way forward, but I hope to be able to say how I conceive of a culture, in something other than empirical fashion. I'm perfectly aware that there are cultural universes, linguistic universes. But I'd like to be able to cross through this empirical reality in a slightly different way." (Ethics, p. 140-141)


Ready whenever you are, Monsieur Badiou.

Durer




From Lazylafargue

I am here/and there is nothing to say/those who wish to get somewhere/let them leave at/any moment - John Cage

This clever, oh so clever blog, is completely deserving of a look, and has prompted the following homage:



Not Wanting to Say Anything About Marcel, I, 1969
silkscreen on 8 plexiglass panels with wooden base, 14.5" x 24" x 14.5"

IF THERE WERE A PART OF LIFE DARK ENOUGH TO KEEP OUT OF IT A LIGHT FROM ART, I WOULD WANT TO BE IN THAT DARKNESS, FUMBLING AROUND IF NECESSARY, BUT ALIVE AND I RATHER THINK THAT CONTEMPORARY MUSIC WOULD BE THERE IN THE DARK TOO, BUMPING INTO THINGS, KNOCKING OTHERS OVER AND IN GENERAL ADDING TO THE DISORDER THAT CHARACTERIZES LIFE (IF IT IS OPPOSED TO ART) RATHER THAN ADDING TO THE ORDER AND STABILIZED TRUTH BEAUTY AND POWER THAT CHARACTERIZE A MASTERPIECE (IF IT IS OPPOSED TO LIFE). AND IS IT? YES
IT IS.

-John Cage


from UBUWEB

Only the impossible is excluded


Image from here.


A nice piece on Georges Perec over at Long Sunday. My current arrangement is a monstrous hybrid of genre, alphabetical, and priority for future reading.

Notes from “Spheres of Action: Art and Politics”

UPDATE: My notes from Boris Groys' talk are posted at the end. He had some fairly interesting things to say about image-use in contemporary media. He also described his project as a kind of polemic against D&G's 'Body Without Organs' and the endless flows of desire, because, he said, 'I have a lot of organs'.

For anyone interested who didn’t watch the netcast, or was unable to attend, I’m posting some of my notes from this event. It should otherwise be available in the archives of the Tate’s online events sometime in the next few weeks. I was taking notes the whole while, but as I willingly endured the conference as it ran from 3am – 11am my time, I had some difficulty staying alert and keeping a clear head. Upon later inspection, my notes had a super-condensed, sentence skipping and word misspelling style which more resembled Adolf Wolfli’s prose than any kind of transcription. I’ve attempted to unravel them a bit. The abstracts that precede each entry are from here. Where I made an attempt to document a larger portion of their talks, I did the best I could - though I would caution the reader that, inevitably, a few words here and there were lost or replaced by others, so it is certainly not verbatim. I would say a 96% accurate approximation. I will make changes to any of this where necessary after I have the chance to see these talks again.

Because so much of this is also important to the place of fiction in Badiou that I touched on briefly in my previous post, more on the subject of the relation between art and politics will be likely to follow in the future when I have more time to do so. Along with that will be some attempts to involve Ranciere’s understanding of an aesthetic regime of the arts, which replaces the representative regime, and paradoxically participates in the potential loss of art as a singular category by being an accomplice in eliminating the distinction between art and other activities.

Surprisingly, this conference did very little to place these issues directly in current contemporary art. Nothing went far beyond the art of the seventies.

Peter Sloterdijk: ‘On a Few Relations between Surrealism and Terror’
Peter Sloterdijk, is Professor of Philosophy and Rector of the School of Fine Arts, Karlsruhe. His numerous books include Critique of Cynical Reason (1983), Rules for the People Park (1999) – subject of a notorious controversy with Habermas – and the recent trilogy, Spheres (1999–2004).


Eric Alliez’s ‘polemical re-introduction’ of the three speakers placed their individual contributions to contemporary aesthetics within a ‘historical anthropology of a new kind’ that has provided, among other things, a ‘de-definition of philosophy, of art, of art history [..] media theory and practice’. Following Alliez’s intro, Sloterdijk took the opportunity to describe himself as ‘a person working on monstrosity’, and began with this humorous and very interesting statement:

‘Philosophy demands of all of us to produce a more or less convicing demonstration of what we call megalomania. It has to be reinterpreted by its carriers…it’s not a choice, its choosing you and you have to cope with it as best you can. It’s a kind of suffering…and one has to be patient of big questions, because as soon as you can accept this kind of existential question you will feel a bit better, though you will not be healed of course…’


His talk, as its title no doubt indicates, focused on ‘some relations between surrealism and terror’ to the extent that ‘modernism is never really able to emancipate itself from its background of fear’. Aesthetic modernity and Surrealism in particular, he contended, use force ‘against indistinct cultural relations’ as a kind of provocation of the art viewer by way of a spectacular investment in ‘radical otherness’. He considered how surrealism had strengthened an ‘explicitation’ (rather than explication) of culture with the ‘articulated aim […] to make the creative processes explicit and elucidate them as much as possible’. As a movement, Surrealism attempted making latent structures apparent while ‘dissolving backgrounds to destroy consensus between producing and receiving sides’, but became a kind of ‘dilletantism’. Surrealism’s ‘wave of attack’ and attempt at ‘astounding the bourgeoisie’, whose public protests they conceived of as being ‘the successful dismantling of a handed down system’ was inevitably only a ‘symbolized aggression’.

As a result, the ‘populus they intended to frighten learned its lesson way too quickly’ – that is, the Surrealist’s attempt to disturb the accepted modalities of artist and artwork reception through shock tactics, spectacle, and a ‘pathology’ or ‘right to individual madness’ had only succeeded for perhaps the brevity of a lightning flash that was the initial ‘event’ of Surrealism. Presenting the viewer with this ‘radical elsewhere in the name of the other’ was only effective until that moment when the bourgeoisie took over through marketing, and indeed, through the artists training of the public itself – at which point the audience could be only formally astounded. Hence, The ‘terrorism’ of the Surrealists cannot succeed when ‘consistently the educated audience adhered to the new conception of art experience’.


Sloterdjik recounted the incident/accident that Salvador Dali (whose Breton-penned anagram was “Avid Dollars”) had experienced during his talk at the International Surrealist Exhibition of 1936 where, coming before the audience in a deep-sea diving suit, he ran into technical difficulties and was unable to breath, eventually collapsing before the audience. An audience that would, moreover, end up applauding his near-death as though it were supposed to have happened, being precisely the dimension of experience that they had been trained so well to enjoy. Dali, of course, understood his work as parallel to the psychoanalytic discovery of the unconscious. His attempt to deal with a ‘precise method which would make the excess of the unconscious controllable’ and his belief that a ‘paranoiac critical method’ could “systematize confusion and thus help to discredit completely the world of reality” (Art in Theory 1900-200, p. 487) were ultimately a failure. The provocation lost its import. Already here an older observation made by Adorno finds itself insinuated:


“In the administered world neutralization is universal. Surrealism began as a protest against the fetishization of art as an isolated realm, yet as art, which after all surrealism also was, it was forced beyond the pure form of protest.” So that “Ultimately, Salvador Dali became an exalted society painter, the Laszlo or Van Dongen of a generation that liked to think of itself as being sophisticated on the basis of a vague sense of a crisis that had in any case been stabilized for decades” (Aesthetic theory, p. 229)



Sloterdjik considered Dali’s public accident prophetic in the sense not only of the spectators reaction, but that Dali would have chosen the symbolic costume of a diver. Sloterdjik thinks that ‘conscious existence must be lived as an explicit dive into context’; that existence is simply another word for ‘context-diving’. He recalled Marshall McLuhan’s idea that we always wear some form of ‘cosmic diving suits’ in order to ‘practice the necessity to dive in different immersion contexts’, becoming divers in multi-media environments. Dali himself was not far from being a martyr of these ‘context-divers’.


‘the artist permanently faces the decision to advance the position of either savior of difference, or warlord of innovation’

He also mentioned Herman Broch’s “air is the last common property, it belongs to everybody.”

‘Social synthesis took on the characteristics of gas warfare, a symbolic gas war that is addressed as democratic press or living in an information society.’

‘life in a media state is like life in an enthusiastic gas palace’

More interesting was the panel discussion where he insisted that ‘making latent structures of existence explicit cannot truly change your conditions of life’ and that ‘we live after dozens of ‘micro-enlightenments’. He focused on the immune system and the immunologist who would either see it as militaristic or as multi-culturalist..that we had no idea until sometime in the eighties that ther was this kind of ‘microbiological police’ acting as some sort of ‘ministry of the interior’.

Surrealism then succeeded to a certain degree because ‘epistemologically we are not the same people as after these ‘cognitive intruders’ came in to show us we are much different than we imagine ourselves to be.’

"The statement "there is information" implies certain statements: there are systems; there are memories; there are cultures; there is artificial intelligence. Even the sentence "there are genes" can only be understood as the product of the new situation - it shows how the principle of information is successfully transferred into the sphere of nature. These gains in concepts that can powerfully tackle reality diminish the interest in traditional figures of theory, such as subject/object/relation. Even the constellation of I and world loses much of its luster, not to mention the worn out polarity of individual and society. But above all, along with the idea of real-existing memories or self-organizing systems, withers the metaphysical distinction between nature and culture. This is because both sides of the distinction are only regional states of information and its processing. One must anticipate that the comprehension of this insight will be particularly hard for those intellectuals who have made their living on the antithesis of culture and nature, and who now find themselves in a reactive position.” from here



About being reliant on an infinite discourse:

‘The leibnizians would answer explication is beyond the reach of human reason because only and infinite mind could penetrate the infinity of implications. Explication will never reach an end, which is why he appeals to the divine intellect, who can penetrate all implications in no time[…]he is very much a literalist with regard to the metaphors of the fold, which means explaining something always means unfolding something to make it plane. But this work of explanation obviously has the aim to make the world bigger by the surface growth of [information], and it is a paradox of modernity, that we live in a world, the cognitive surface of which is growing. But the individual can always resign and stop thinking, and our convictions are what allow us to participate in explanation….’


His respondent Adrian Rifkin had considered his talk as making an ‘incredibly bold move by taking Dali seriously’, and another audience member made the evaluation that Surrealism was at least a decade old when Dali had made his infamous deep-sea diver suit speech, criticizing the artist as being someone who sucked up to the system, the choice of him as a figure being rather sad

Sloterdjik gave this response:

‘This is an evaluation and it is every difficult to refute evaluations. What I had to say about Dali’s appropriation is quite clear. I see him as a man who is playing a role, a symptomatic role.. that requires a reconstruction. I count him a s a kind of witness. [Witnesses] do not have to be your friends, they are part of a historical evolution that have a right to be heard…this is sufficient reason to go back to witnesses of this quality.’


Peter Weibel: ‘The Political Revolution of the Neo-Avant-Garde’
Abstract: Traditionally the Neo-Avantgarde after 1945 is discredited as a purely formalist movement, blinding out the political content of the Avantgarde of the 1920s. But assuming that the Avantgarde movements from 1950 to 1970 share the same epistemic field as the cultural theories of their time, from semiotics to psychoanalysis, we can apply these theories to these art movements and discover in a new approach that the Neo-Avant-Garde was a political art, not on the level of representation but on the level of the dispositiv: transforming our traditional concept of the image, destroying it and deserting it, extending into space and time, defining it as an arena of action, and therefore expanding our conception of art and art-activities. In daily life, on the streets, beyond the studios and museums. The political revolution of the Neo-Avant-Garde operated on the level of the display, the dispositiv, the tool, negating our traditional media of memory and representation because after Stalinism, Fascism, and Hitlerism it became difficult to believe in the means of traditional culture. The proposed new methods, a radical critique, will produce new and surprising results and interpretations of this period.
Peter Weibel, artist and media theorist, is Director of the Center for Art and Media, Karlsruhe and author of Fast Forward: Media Art (2004) and The Open Work, 1964–1979 (2005).



Weibel wanted to elucidate the question as to what the relations of experiments in the field of politics and aesthetics could be. He observed that the Neo-Avant-Garde often appears as a ‘purely formalist movement’ and appears ‘in a pejorative sense in Marxism’. He spoke about the ends of painting, the ends of representation, Rodchenko’s ‘last painting’, Malevich’s suprematism, even Duchamp, as artistic strategies which brought about a sort of ‘zero degree’ in art. Instead of understanding them as purely formalist, the question proper to these developments, he insisted, should be: what were the external conditions of this art? One of these conditions was the problem, still existing, of thinking art to be a mirror for society - for instance in the way that Greek sculpture can have a ‘smell of democracy’ (when in fact, it is a ‘beautiful art’ related to a ‘barbarian society’).

Yves Klein



Otto Muehl

Herman Nitsch

Weibel insisted on a ‘comparability’ between the aesthetic and social orders or disorders. To the question of what could replace art as a ‘mirror’ we can go to the avante-garde, the end of representation, the end of painting, the end of the mirror…But they also found a way to go back to representation that was not a mirror - such as can be found in the later ‘naïve’ paintings of Picasso. What Weibel described as a ‘reaction formation’ in the Neo-Avante-Garde was in part the lingering trauma from a war that brought about a kind of desire to forget through the attempt at representing the unrepresentable, that which has no expression. So in a sense it is ‘impossible to express what has been experienced’. This is something still important today: the unnameable. We see it in Beckett’s ‘writing of the generic’(Badiou’s term) or even in Cage’s ‘works of silence’. His artists of choice here: Yves Klein, Otto Muehl, Herman Nitzch. ( Weibel also sees the fact that no one mentions the source of Hiroshima in Yves Klein a form of ‘ideological blindness’).

But, just as with Surrealism, and perhaps the fate of all art that presents its ‘radicality’ in the context of a market that will accept, absorb, and repackage everything and anything claiming alterity, ‘culture buys into art’s zero degree, mistaking it for a kind of purification’, and the possibility of any real effect becomes, in a way, silenced. Most are familiar with Adorno’s saying - which was brought into the talk by Weibel - that ‘there can be no poetry after Auschwitz’. The idea that the images are somehow not powerful enough, that ‘it becomes the formalist limp explanation’ which instead gave way to ‘a return of the real condition of art practices…the real context, not the content’. This I assume, is what he means of “socially aware and politically engaged” art that we can see in Beuys, Haake, Kaprow, or the ‘Institutional Critique’ of Andrea Fraser or Daniel Buren. Incidentaly it was also pointed out that the term 'Institutional Critique' has its origin in the work of Fredric Jameson, and not, as is so often assumed, with Benjamin H.D. Buchloh.

As a helping hand to my inability to truly capture what was said by Weibel, here’s a (rather lengthy) polemical supplement from Ranciere on “politicized art”:

“It can be said that an artist is committed as a person, and possibly that he is committed by his writings, his paintings, his films, which contribute to a certain type of political struggle. An artist can be committed, but what does it mean to say that his art is committed? Commitment is not a category of art. This does not mean that art is apolitical. It means that aesthetics has its own politics, or its own meta-politics. […] The fact that someone writes to serve a cause or that someone discusses workers or the common people instead of aristocrats, what exactly is this going to change regarding the precise conditions for the elaboration and reception of a work of art? Certain means are going to be chosen instead of others according to a principle of adaptation. The problem, however, is that the adaptation of expression to subject matter is a principle of the representative tradition that the aesthetic regime of art has called into question. That means that there is no criterion for establishing a correspondence between aesthetic virtue and political virtue. There are only choices. A progressive or revolutionary painter or novelist in the 1920’s and 1930’s will generally choose a a chaotic form in order to show that the reigning order is just as much a disorder. Like Dos Passos, he will represent a shattered reality: fragmented stories of erratic individual destinies that translate, by their illogicality, the logic of the capitalist order. Painters like Dix or Grosz in Germany, on the other hand, will represent a human/inhuman universe, a universe where human beings drift between marionettes, masks, and skeletons. They thereby play between two types of inhumanity: the inhumanity of the masks and automatons of the social parade and the inhumanity of the deadly machine that upholds this parade. These plastic or narrative devices can be identified with an exemplary political awareness of the contradictions inherent in a social and economic order. They can, however, just as well be denounced as reactionary nihilism or even considered to be pure formal machines without political content. Novelistic fragmentation or pictorial carnivalization lend themselves just as well to describing the chaos of the capitalist world from the pint of view of class struggle as to describing, from a nihilistic point of view, the chaos of a world where class struggle is itself but one element in the Dionysian chaos.” (The Politics of Aesthetics, p. 60-61)




Boris Groys: ‘The Politics of Equal Aesthetic Rights’
Abstract: Art and politics are connected at least in one fundamental respect: both are realms in which a struggle for recognition is being waged. The artists of the classical avant-garde have struggled to achieve recognition for all possible signs, forms, things or events as having the equal “aesthetic rights“, e.g. as having the same right to be represented in the public collections, put on display on the art exhibitions etc. But after many decades of struggle the art of today still operates in a gap between formal equality and factual inequality. Art practice is still a material practice operating in the context of the contemporary mass media market. To understand the actual functioning of art under the regime of equal aesthetic rights means to reflect on the material, technical and economical side of the contemporary art system.
Boris Groys, art historian and theorist, is Professor at the School of Fine Arts, Karlsruhe. His books include Stalin’s Total Work of Art (1988) Ilya Kabavov (1998) and Über das Neue! (1999).



‘Art is of course political. It is impossible to isolate art from the political sphere. All the attempts to define art as autonomous, to situate it above, beyond, and nearby the political field, is utterly naïve.. But having said that, we should not forget that art cannot be reduced to a specific field among many other fields where the political decisions are made, or reflected. It is not enough to say that art is dependent upon politics. […] Our aesthetic tastes , our aesthetic predispositions, dictate to us, very often unconsciously… certain political decisions.’

Boris Groys – lecture at platform 1 documenta 11 (ending statements)



'The museum has been stripped of its normalizing role…the general public now draws it’s notion of art from advertising, mtv, video games, and Hollywood blockbusters…The most powerful and invasive are 'not images of entertainment, but those of war, terror, and catastrophy of all kinds...The dominant aesthetics of our times is commercial mass media'.

If all images are already potentially acknowledged as being of equal aesthetic vaule, ‘media has become the space where the quest for the true art takes place’…War images functioning as ‘contemporary media sublime’. 'Abu Ghraib videos and images have a parallel to the quality of American art of the sixties and seventies, where the goal is to reveal a naked body that is habitually covered by cultuaral conventions’. Although this is ‘perverted in the war images…in an act of humiliation of the other’. Yet, these images have also become ‘Icons of the contemporary collective imagination… in a more powerful way than Picasso or Goya could ever achieve’…which is ‘something painful to art’. Because art had wanted to be radical, though such a ‘criteria of radicalness has not been lost to our current understanding of art’.

‘[…]fundamentally flawed, terrorism is not iconoclastic as the Avant-Garde was… and [the images] are instead the iconic realizations of what is terribly real…the war images cannot be criticized in aesthetic terms’.

Groys insisted that, with the birth of the museum, it was the curators who produced “art”, not artists. ‘Art is not primarily the production of art objects, not art market…it is the ability to put disparate elements in a secular shared space’. So that ‘what we have now is not peace, but a peaceful coexistence among certain practices’. ‘Museums cannot be places where ‘everything is possible’ but are always limited and questionable’. ‘museums are like cemeteries…it’s a good compliment because with media you have the illusion that the images are alive – they are not vital’. ‘Art has an incapacity to curate itself, truth has an incapacity to product itself’.

‘The space of the museum […]is often disliked because it is a closed space, as opposed to the open space of media…this closure should not be interpreted in opposition to the outside, but as creating its outside…media does not create an open space, but an ‘undifferentiated homogeneity’ that has no outside’. There is an ‘imperial hubris of contemporary media…images don’t emerge in the clearing of being on their own accord’.

'There is a ‘violence of showing’ that says an artwork can be interpreted as a near document, which in the curatorial dimension becomes a complete document for a narrative purpose'.

‘You can use certain images for art which is ok…but you can use it in a pragmatic unjust way - just as a material’. ‘There is not a situation of stability between art and not art…with any art production we delineate the difference, define the difference in new way’.

Badiou, fiction, and the generic will

As I had some time tonight, this morning, whatever, while faithfully awaiting a netcast of the Tate’s "Sphere’s of Action: Art and Politics" (3am MST, by God), I thought I could address some fairly recent lectures at Birkbeck that have generated quite a few interesting posts in the blogosphere - mostly regarding the subject of populism. Being hundreds of miles away without yet having figured out how my computer can play the entire conference, I want to use this post to focus on Badiou’s talk, the pdf transcription and mp3 of which are here. As a kind of response to some posts by k-punk, who suggested that “only fictions are capable of generating belief”, and Bat over at lenin’s tomb, who insisted that the generic will, as opposed to fiction, was actually the more politically important concept offered by Badiou, I want to sketch out why it seems to me that the idea of fiction is just as politically important as that of the generic will itself. Along the way, a couple of brief paragraphs to recapitulate what was in Badiou’s talk ( for another run down see IT). I am of course, a bit fatigued at this hour so this is definitely subject to a series of revisions.



Badiou began by explaining that the political process, his “non-expressive dialectics” is the enacting of a separation from the reality of law and order, or the ‘identity of law and desire’ that projects clear and distinct proper names for that which should, effectively, be without proper name. Collective action 'separated from the objective reality of a singular expression' would take place outside of identity, representation, predicative classification or the opposition of reactionary and revolutionary politics. This led into Badiou's 'Logical Joke' involving a bowl of fruit filled with apples, strawberries and the like which one day becomes infested with all kinds of anomalous elements (dried mud, dead frogs, etc.). The real problem then becomes one of accepting and recognizing, rather than excluding, those “other things” in society, or the ‘bowl’ - those real and existing elements which, in and of themselves, so to speak, or in combination with the other nameable elements are 'strange multiplicities' without name.



Badiou then directed the attention toward the definition of law as ‘a decision to accept something as really existing’ that usually opts for the easy way out, which is to exclude those ‘strange multiplicities’ which have no clear name. These are decisions which are always constructed from the relation (or 'non-relation' to be properly Foucauldian) between words and things. Desire then, as the faithful subject’s investigation within what is know and accepted as existing, is that search for something beyond the law, for a pure singularity - an 'apple which is also a pickle' . Of course, even the mathematician has desire, and Badiou - who wants to assure us he is not a 'mathematical terrorist' – gave an example of the rejection by most mathematicians of Kurt Godel's "constructible sets". Why was this rejected in the domain of mathematics? Badiou's answer was that even within mathematics, where it would be impossible to function without law, there is always a desire to exceed that which can be normalized and constructed in order to find a sort of 'mathematical monster'. Something to which Paul Cohen's invention of the generic set was able to answer in the sixties.



But the struggle in the political space – as Badiou sees these conepts in their ‘socio-political’ application - is then not reducible to the struggle between genericity and constructibility, where you have the generic will against normal desires. Something else has to be made, some other change has to occur, and desire within the generic will is ‘always the process of a new conception’ so that it is not desire against law, but ‘generic will against normal desires’. But this is itself a ‘fiction’, and it is here that fiction as the necessary aesthetico-political component to the generic will is most important. K-punk offered this “intensely compressed suggestion”:



The first hypothesis we might hazard is that, counter-intuitively, only fictions are capable of generating belief […] The belief at stake is clearly not a propositional but an attitudinal belief; which is to say, not a belief that a particular factual state of affairs obtains but belief as a set of commitments.



According to Badiou, these are fictions without proper name – and this is a point which runs throughout his work, from his writings on Mallarme, to Beckett, through the dense territories of set theory and the subjects faithful investment in a truth. K-punk’s ideas brought to mind the work of Michel De Certeau, where the problem of belief for him seems (provisionally) parallel to Badiou’s insistence on our need for fiction. De Certeau had defined belief “[…] not as the object of believing (a dogma, a program, etc.) but as the subject’s investment in a proposition, the act of saying it and considering it as true – in other words, a “modality of the assertion and not its content.”(The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 178). A content which, pace Badiou, is completely generic, infinite, unnameable, and whose assertion, as act of saying is directly correlative to the forcing of the generic, so that we also have the understanding that “[…]the techniques of “making people believe” play a more decisive role when it is a matter of something that does not yet exist’. (ibid., p. 184)



As Badiou has also mentioned several times before, truth does not inhere in the proposition – something which may also make De Certeau’s statements appear antithetical to what Badiou is attempting to clarify, although on this point I remain a bit undecided. What counts is indeed the subject’s investment (or commitment, fidelity) in this "new fiction" which would then be produced as the fiction of the generic itself, the creation of this part without proper name. It should not attempt to replace, or maintain a more ‘valuable’ status as that of the generic will (and vice versa), but instead is grafted onto it. The fiction is the forcing and separating maintenance of the generic, as a kind of ‘monstrosity’ of knowledge. K-punks also quite rightly draws attention to the characteristic fictions of capitalism - one needs certain necessary pre-existing fictions to restore some way of overcoming them. His conclusions are not so far off from those reached by Etienne Balibar, who recalled the difference between the two universals: capitalism and subjective investment. But this difference, between false universal capitalism on the one hand and the 'true' universal of evental fidelity on the other, has to be



'neutralised in some way in order to bring out the generic characteristics of the subjective universalization of a singularity, of the relationship between fidelity and event, as opposed to the existing opposition between the true universal and the false universal. The universal must also be based on the false, or at least the non-true or fiction if we are to be able to understand the radical difference between it and its simulacrum or even its extreme simulacrum, that being - if I may be so bold as to say so - the 'forcing' of difference as the name of truth.' (“The History of Truth: Alain Badiou in French Philosophy”, Think Again, p. 38)



A quick return to Badiou's idea of separation, since a ‘political process is not a process of expression […] but a process of separation’, one can proceed through a subjective fidelity toward a verification of a truth via fiction. So this making of a ‘fiction’ is that process whereby a truth is, step by step, constructed by the (localized ) subject in order to reconfigure knowledge - which has to then be a sort of ‘non-knowledge’ production: the generic will, generic humanity, that ‘apple which is also a pickle’. Alberto Toscano has addressed this as well, saying that '[...]the highest task of thought (and of politics) lies in the production of Sameness - and not in the contagions of hybridity, the call of alterity or the experience of difference.' (“Communism as Separation”, in Think Again, p. 138-39) Also:




"Ordinary reality is a space of placements, a partitioned order, a network of relations, in short, a law-bound structure of representations. Thought is a two-fold operation: the separation, out of this structure, of an immanent excess and the rigorous application of this excess, this real kernel of illegality, back on to representation, to unhinge and transform its coherence." (ibid., 138)



Badiou would again assure us that the fiction proper to a truth is the fiction of its completion, as it cannot, via Lacan, be wholly-said. It involves the possibility of these ‘generic fictions’ to produce effects in reality or ‘reconfigurations of the shared sensible order’ to use Ranciere’s terminology. These terms of fiction and generic will enact a mutual support, as the generic will is impotent without the constructions of these fictions; that is, it can lack its political import were it not for the fictive deployment of its being, the “process of its truth”. It might be possible to make further comparison with Ranciere, who would insist that politics has its aesthetics and aesthetics has its politics…these ‘fictions’, then, are like the aesthetic counterpart to the political concept of the generic will.



‘Politics and art, like forms of knowledge, construct ‘fictions’, that is to say material rearrangements of signs and images, relationships between what is seen and what is said, between what is done and what can be done’ (The Politics of Aesthetics, p. 38)

Spheres of Action: Art and Politics

An upcoming (Saturday) online conference at the Tate, as previously mentioned by Infinite Thought. This conference will be chaired by Eric Alliez, who was counted as a "notable exception" by Alain Badiou when he was busy handing out the insult of 'little Deleuzians' to those that reacted strongly in defense of their Master upon the publication of his Deleuze. How very kind of him.

THE INAUGURAL POST

Welcome to this Blog's inaugural post. This being my first attempt at a Blog (I'm still fussing with the html for some reason), I can't say for sure what I'll be using it for. But, given what seems to suit the medium you can expect reading notes, links to things of interest, and whatever else I feel needs to be written down because it can't readily be translated into anything that would hang on a wall, take up a room, smell, travel through the air in the form of sound, be performed in public or private, or move past the eye at fps. What follows are some reading notes from the past few weeks that I have managed to give some semblance of an order over the weekend. They concern a certain Frenchman who liked to climb flagpoles and steal food. Your comments are welcome and appreciated.

THREE STANDARD STOPPAGES


I. THE LEGACY VIRUS

A certain amount of time should be spent in libraries if one really desires to get a sense for what may have animated the thought of Marcel Duchamp ("MD" from here on out). Libraries were Foucault’s heterotopias par excellance, places of slow transformations, time piling up upon itself, that invisible disorder which can be appreciated only by way of a prolonged exposure (it is an acquired taste, after all). For a time MD was employed as a librarian at the Bibliotheque Sainte-Genevieve in Paris where he would find the inspiration for his Boite-en-Valise and especially The Green Box that would, much like a catalogue, accompany The Large Glass. If one were to visit a library now, perhaps in pursuit of certain volumes which might contain pieces of the extant knowledge production surrounding MD, they would surely find no shortage of authors – with some exceptions, Marjorie Perloff being one of them - participating in his ‘Canonization’ who readily hand his life and work over to the Dadaist movement. (As if he belonged there, as if he were so obviously one of them). Yet this fact is key, since MD himself was not a Dadaist, and there is an ever-apparent shortage/lack/absence of historical and critical accounts of his ‘legacy’ that would view the fact of his Dadaist nomination as a systemic problem.

One of the more interesting refutations of ‘MD the Dadaist’ that I am aware of happens to have come from a former professor of mine, Steven Michael Vroom. Slide lectures on art of the early twentieth century were always an appropriate time to assure his students – no doubt quick to passively accept the endless stream of Dadaist accounts - that “retroactively assigning a man to a movement that didn’t happen yet is a historical fallacy” (that’s verbatim I might add). Certainly this statement applies across the board, although it is most effective when thought in the context of those who would place MD, Dada, and his 1913 Bicycle Wheel all within the same space. It should be noted that Dada itself, as a word and movement, was not even invented until the events of 1916 surrounding the Cabaret Voltaire. Regardless of Dada as a ‘spirit’ or quality whose atemporal nature one can find examples of in societies throughout history (which MD himself explains here), some of what characterized the Dadaist’s work and activities, their anti-art stance and opposition to the bourgeoisie, while shared by MD, are not enough to qualify him as a Dadaist. Par example: he ‘refused’ when asked to contribute to the Dada Salon of 1920, instead sending a telegram where “Peau de balle” was spelled “Pode bal” (roughly, “Balls to you”) and saying later: “Well, what in the world could I send them? I didn’t have anything especially interesting to send, I didn’t even know what Dada was.” (Pierre Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, 65)
With Hidden Noise

Taken to its humorous extreme, MD’s involvement/non-involvement with the Dadaists could perhaps benefit from an invocation of Alain Badiou’s idiosyncratic use of set theory: of all the artists, poets, etc., surrounding that historical, inconsistent multiplicity that we can collected under the name “Dada”, the life and work of MD would be a part, but not a member. “Proto-Dadaist” might be better, but is still lacking, and Uberdada might also work if that title did not already belong to Johannes Baader. As endless as the documents that refer to MD as a Dadaist seem to be, likewise are the reasons that works such as Fountain, The Large Glass, With Hidden Noise, L.H.O.O.Q., Tzank Check…etc., should be seen as events whose only proper name is Duchamp. MD, the non-dadaist non-artist, ‘author’ of the readymade, the assisted readymade, the reciprocal readymade, and by far my personal favorite, more humorous than the idea of using a Rembrandt as an ironing board, was the “unhappy readymade”: a geometry book replete with all of its mathematical certainties sent to Jean Crotti along with instructions to hang it by strings on the balcony of his apartment in the rue Condamine. The book was, much as the map that covered the territory in Borges’ “Of Exactitude in Science”, abandoned “to the rigors of sun and rain.” MD’s singular genius as subtracted from the Dadaist movement was probably best described by the artist Willem de Kooning, who it is doubtful MD could have ever found it in himself to even like:



And then there is that one-man movement, Marcel Duchamp - for me a truly modern movement because it implies that each artist can do what he thinks he ought to - a movement for each person and open for everybody.
- "What Abstract Art Means to Me," Museum of Modern Art Bulletin, vol. 18, nr. 3 (June 1951), p. 7

fermentation/firm intention

II. A CURIOUS ABSENCE

Why is it that the writings of Gilles Deleuze never appropriated that elusive artistic figure that is MD? John Cage, who surely would not have been able to create work in the way that he did without the artworld ‘presence-absence’ of MD, is mentioned several times in the pages of A Thousand Plateaus. This is almost enough of an oddity in itself. That no attention was paid to MD, rather than representing some sort of ignorance on the part of Deleuze, may have had more to do with Deleuze’s definite fixation on the affective or “sensuous” in art, which is something that MD’s most significant output was calculatingly opposed to. On this point there is a scribbling in MD’s notes that surely would have irritated Deleuze: “The ultimate for/a collector/is to take/Aspirin/for his Henri Matisses”. Better still is the possibility that MD’s chess obsession (he was just shy of being awarded the title “International Grand Master”) led Deleuze to leave him alone. Chess was a game more suited for MD’s Cartesian mind, the endgame strategies of which he would deterritorialize into art - whereas Deleuze was more fond of the game Go for its “smooth” spaces as opposed to the “striated” of chess.

Chess is a game of State, or of the court: the emperor of China played it. Chess pieces are coded […]Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, collective, or third-person
function: “It” makes a move. (ATP, p. 352-353)


Chess is indeed a war, but an institutionalized, regulated, coded war, with a front, a rear, battles. But what is proper to Go is war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is a semiology.
(ibid. , p. 353)



However, if one were to rattle off a list of those ideas and literary figures important to MD, it could almost be confused with the same type of list compiled for Deleuze: movement, time, history, chance (and not just chance, but a pure chance), nonsense (or “anti-sense” rather), humor, desire; authors such as Roussell, Jarry, and Mallarme; the brain… Then of course there is the case of MD’s Bartleby-like refusal to be an artist (his non-activity or “attitude of the mind”), a refusal to even participate - in the sense that this could be associated with say, the cubist painters or the Dadaists - in any sort of ‘artistic community’. Upon close inspection, one also gets the sense from both Deleuze and MD that, very often, what they wanted more than anything was simply to disappear.

Ever since they were first translated by Richard Hamilton, MD’s notes have become famous for their surplus of puns, wordplay, Wittgensteinian propositions, descriptions of obscure machines, and examples of his “Playful Physics” (read: Pataphysics). All with the air of the subversive “prankster” that artists today such as SuttonBeresCuller, Maurizio Cattellan, and Martin Creed owe so much too. Even more interesting is MD’s idea of the Infrathin – a ‘distance between the mold and the real’. Some of his examples:

- the warmth of a seat (which hasjust/been left) is Infrathin
- when the tobacco smoke smells also of the/mouth which exhales it, the two odors/marry by Infrathin

- 2 forms cast in/the same mold differ from each other by an Infrathin separative amount.

- All “identicals” as/identical as they may be, (and/the more indentical they are)/move toward this/infra thin seperative/ difference


Aren’t Deleuze’s descriptions of events as ‘incorporeal entities’ in The Logic of Sense also very similar? For Deleuze, an event takes place at the surface of things, at the surface of states of affairs, bodies and their mixtures - the Stoic discovery that was also Valery’s profound idea: “Deeper than any other ground is the surface of the skin.” (The Logic of Sense, p. 141). The Infrathin is an “infinitesimal thickness” that has all the properties of Deleuze’s virtual -


The question is less that of attaining the immediate than of determining the site where the immediate is “immediately” as not-to-be-attained(comme non-a-atteindre): the surface where the void and every event alon with it are
made […] non-thought, shooting which becomes non-shooting, to speak without speaking[...] (ibid., p. 137)

...



Another curiosity involves just how readily MD’s early mechanistic paintings, as well as his notes and elements of The Large Glass, lend themselves not only to D&G’s concept of desiring machines, but also to the theories of Bergson. So far, Sarat Maharaj is the only ‘art researcher’ to my knowledge who has – correctly I believe – spoken about Henri Bergson’s influence on MD. If MD were to have actually been reading Bergson (and there is enough evidence to support this), it would have made possible something which has been contested ground: that the formal innovations of his Nude Descending a Staircase were invented without his ever having seen the work of the Italian Futurists, who had also been reading the aforementioned “vitalist philosopher”. I have often wondered whether the conical diagram on p. 152 of Matter and Memory (1911) was the source for the “dancing cones” embedded in The Large Glass. Maharaj explains MD’s relation to Bergson:

For Bergson, ‘readymade’ signaled the mechanical, repetitive, all-too-known – as opposed to dimensions of unpredictable possibility, the virtual. In a
flip-over, Duchamp floated the idea of the ‘readymade’ as a vehicle for raiding
the unknown – ‘the mechanical’ itself becomes a medium for breaking out of auto-pilot artistic experience into ‘other’ conceptual spaces. Duchamp interacts with Bergson – not as academic commentary but researcher-practitioner – turning
his ideas and terms upside down, fleshing them out as concrete images.

- Sarat Maharaj, “Unfinishable Sketch of ‘An Unknown Object in 4 D’: Scenes of Artistic Research”, L&B, vol. 18, p. 46





III. “THE MISSIONARY OF INSOLENCE”: AGAMBEN’S READING

“It’s completely in one’s gray matter”
- MD

With all of the subtleties that accompany the movements of Giorgio Agamben’s text The Man Without Content, there is for this reader a nagging feeling that he is attempting to restore to art and artistic subjectivity a status whose vulgarity has not been seen since ‘Abstract Expressionism’ – not to mention the irritating proliferation of untranslated Greek. The “secret nihilism” governing the history of Western art, the “self-annihilating nothing”, the split and the split of the split…all of that is better suited for another post, and one I won’t be likely to write. That said, what I want to concentrate on instead are Agamben’s accounts of the readymades’ significance. The gist of his reading is not at all dissimilar to the conclusions Peter Burger had reached in his 1974 Theory of the Avant-Garde, where the readymades ‘authenticity’ dissolves in the mass produced object and individual creation is negated (though posterity has consequently returned them to the ‘authentic’). Were one not playing the role of careful reader, they might even miss that although Agamben’s prose is indeed a long, slow, drawn out dance, he does actually manage to address even what MD himself considered to be significant about those timed interventions that were his readymades.
Agamben sets out an analysis of the readymades as objects that escape both aesthetic enjoyment and the consumption of the reproducible technical object, since they have an inherent inability to attain presence and become suspended between an oscillating double status of productive activity . This is set against the “loss” of arts original dimension since “[…]the privileged status of art in the aesthetic sphere is artificially interpreted as the survival of a condition in which manual and intellectual labor are not yet divided and in which, therefore, the productive act maintains all its integrity and uniqueness; by contrast, technical production, which takes place starting from a condition of extreme division of labor, remains essentially fungible and reproducible.” (The Man Without Content, p. 61-62). It was MD’s readymades which first attempted to flatten this opposition between a product that has a perpetual potentiality or reproducibility and the work of art as always a being-at-work, a scheme that would “actualize at least for an instant a suspension of these two statuses” (ibid, p. 67)
This is all fine, but also, and most importantly, not what MD was truly interested in; that is, a removal of art from the established parameters of a sensuous encounter. Since, regardless of what the readymades accomplished through a suspension of status where they could occupy neither the position of authenticity nor that of reproducibility, the success of the work is ultimately predicated on it’s failure – a failure to achieve the status of non-art as its goal or truth and instead revealing a truth of an entirely different nature. MD’s flip-flop made sure that not only was his “attitude of the mind” a creative act at the same time as being a form of indifferent ‘art research’, but that the spectator’s involvement as ‘research-interpreter’ via ID check (ibid., p. 50), was itself a creative act. But what else could it possibly be? If these objects were not art, were never intended as art, and the ‘artist’ MD “relinquished all responsibility”, then the only way for them to register as works of art was by way of the viewer’s intervention. The readymades’ status as art had to be created. The addition of value to their reproducibility was not dependent upon MD’s placing them in the context of an art exhibition, but instead on the viewer’s mind – on their own “gray matter”. The foregrounding of discourse and a criticality of the readymades themselves by way of their rare selction had turned them into a kind of fun-house mirror before the spectator.
MD’s inversion of the scheme was to present non-art which then had art as its shadow - no other “work” from this time period shows more forcefully that ‘cadaverous’ nature of an art object and the fact that there is nothing inherent in the work of art that could make it be in itself a work of art. Rather, MD made visible and demonstrated the dimension of art’s construction as “work” or object with aesthetic value as a process originating within the community. Though Duchamp would have claimed no responsibility for the outcome of his interventions, they were in every sense of the word collaborations – his reversal laid bare this truth, revealing the mechanisms at work…and Agamben eventually locates the future of art somewhere outside of the object, in a more original time and rhythm, so that when one engages with a work of art, the “[…] artists and spectators recover their essential solidarity and their common ground.” (ibid., p.102)
To avoid a misunderstanding, we must remember that this 'art coefficient' is a personal expression of art a' l'e 'tat brut, that is, still in a raw state, which must be 'refined' as pure sugar from molasses by the spectator; the digit of this coefficient has no bearing whatsoever on his verdict. The creative act takes another aspect when the spectator experiences the phenomenon of transmutation: through the change from inert matter into a work of art, an actual transubstantiation has taken place, and the role of the spectator is to determine the weight of the work on the esthetic scale.

All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualification and thus adds his contrubution to the creative act. This becomes even more obvious when posterity gives a final verdict and sometimes rehabilitates forgotten artists.

(MD, From Session on the Creative Act, Convention of the American Federation of Arts, Houston, Texas, April 1957)


"All our writing - for everyone and if it were ever writing of everyone - would be this: the anxious search for what was never written in the present, but in a past to come." - Maurice Blanchot

Contact: keith.tilford@gmail.com

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